free to extract small sums unconstitutionally from its taxpayers. For example, a state could enact a statute under which all resident aliens would be taxed an additional $1.00 per year, or a single malicious tax assessor could slightly overassess the property of nonresidents of the state. As a purely economic matter, these taxpayers would be better off paying the unconstitutional tax than incurring the legal fees necessary to challenge the tax.' 0 Section 1983 offers an alternative to inadequate state remedies. Congress enacted section 1983 to provide a civil remedy for deprivations of federal rights under color of state law, such as unconstitutional taxation. To further the goals of section 1983, Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 ("section 1988")," which provides for the recovery of attorney's fees by successful plaintiffs in a number of actions including those under section 1983.12 Because the monetary dam- 10 . The facts of a recent case, Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 281 S.C. 492, 316 S.E.2d 386 (1984) , affd by an equally divided Court, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) (per curiam), serve to illustrate the problem. The Spencers, residents of North Carolina, earned all of their income in South Carolina and were subject to South Carolina income tax provisions. South Carolina had a statute which denied non-residents certain deductions and therefore taxed these individuals more heavily than otherwise similar South Carolina residents. The amount of the tax illegally imposed on the Spencers was under $600.00, substantially less than the expense necessary to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. Although the statute was patently unconstitutional, the unavailability of attorney's fees reduced the Spencers' incentive to challenge the statute. In addition, because the Spencers were not residents of South Carolina and were therefore ineligible to vote in South Carolina elections, they had no opportunity to effect a change in the statute through the political process. In the debates over § 1988, Congress noted the importance of attorney's fees in ensuring the protection of federal rights. See 122 CONG. REC. 35,128 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Seiberling) ("In fact, a failure to authorize the awarding of attorneys' fees in civil rights cases will, as a practical matter, repeal the civil rights laws for most Americans."); id. at 35,127 (remarks of Rep. Holtzman) ("[Section 19881 will help to assure that all Americans can have access to the courts to obtain the protections age resulting from unconstitutional taxation may not be large enough to make it worthwhile for an individual taxpayer to incur the legal fees necessary to challenge the tax, the availability of attorney's fees can make the difference between protecting the federal rights of taxpayers and allowing violations to go unredressed. 1 3
B. The Unavailability of Federal Courts for State Tax Section 1983 Claims
Taxpayer challenges to unconstitutional state taxation, even those challenges brought pursuant to section 1983, are not actionable in federal court."' Federal courts are precluded from entertaining state tax section 1983 claims by a long-standing policy of federal judicial noninterference with state taxation. This policy is embodied in the Tax Injunction Act, 15 the Eleventh Amendment, 6 and the principle of comity as articulated by the Supreme Court in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association v.
McNaryY1
The Tax Injunction Act bars federal courts from granting prospective relief-either injunctive or declaratory 18 -from unconstitutional state taxation." 9 The Act prohibits federal district courts from restraining a state in its taxing power if a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" is available in against discrimination contained in our laws and the Constitution."); see also Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 11 (noting importance of § 1988 to § 1983 claimants).
13. The Senate Report on the Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 noted: "If our civil rights laws are not to become mere hollow pronouncements which the average citizen cannot enforce, we must maintain the traditionally effective remedy of fee shifting in these cases." S. REP 40 This Note argues that these refusals are based on a misconception of the role of state courts in the federal scheme and are therefore improper. State courts must entertain federal causes of action over which they have jurisdiction, and section 1983 actions are no exception to this rule.
A. The Obligation of State Courts to Entertain Federal Causes of Action
The obligation of state courts to entertain federal causes of action is well established. In Testa v. Katt, 4 1 the Supreme Court broadly ruled that a state court generally is not free to deny the enforcement of a valid federal claim if that court has "jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under In several of these cases, the § 1983 claimant was challenging allegedly unconstitutional state taxation. For a discussion of the propriety of state court refusals to entertain state tax § 1983 claims, see infra notes 79-113 and accompanying text.
41. 330 U.S. 386 (1947) . Testa involved a Rhode Island court's refusal to entertain an action brought under the federal Emergency Price Control Act. The refusal was premised on the belief that the Act was a penal law, and that the courts of Rhode Island were not obligated to enforce the penal laws of another sovereign. 45 dismissed as "quite inadmissible" the contention that a state court could refuse to entertain a federal cause of action if the federal law in question conflicted with the policy of the state. 4 The Court held that Congress, acting under the supremacy clause, had preempted any conflicting state policy. 4 7 In addressing the assertion that enforcing federal causes of action would unduly burden state courts, the Court noted that "[w]e are not disposed to believe that the exercise of jurisdiction by the state courts will be attended by any appreciable inconvenience or con- In deciding Testa, a decision based squarely on the supremacy clause, the Court relied heavily on its earlier interpretation of that clause in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876) (assignee in bankruptcy allowed to bring action in state court to recover from judgment suffered by bankrupt party which was obtained in violation of federal bankruptcy law). Although the question presented in Claflin was not whether a state court must entertain a federal cause of action, but rather whether it could do so, the Court's broad holding laid the foundation for the rule that state courts are obligated to entertain federal causes of action, a proposition later articulated explicitly in Testa. Testa, Mondou, and McKnett firmly establish two principles: State courts are obligated to entertain federal causes of action whenever their jurisdiction is adequate to adjudicate similar claims, and state courts may not discriminate against federal causes of action. Under these rules, a state court may refuse to entertain a federal cause of action only if it has a neutral procedural or jurisdictional reason for so doing. 51 To be neutral, a state court's reason for refusing to entertain a federal action must apply equally to all actions, whether provided by state or federal law.
B. Section 1983 Actions in State Court
Section 1983 claims should not be exempted from the requirement that Testa imposes on state courts to entertain federal causes of action. Although on two occasions the Supreme Court has specifically reserved the question whether state courts are required to entertain section 1983 actions, 52 the Court has implied th'at they must. 53 ferently from other federal causes of action, and will conclude that state courts must entertain section 1983 claims.
The "Mistrust" Justification
At least one state court has asserted that it would be illogical to require state courts to entertain section 1983 actions in light of the fact that section 1983 was originally enacted precisely because Congress mistrusted these courts. 54 Support for the propositions that the 1871 Congress, which enacted section 1983, was creating a cause of action in federal court and that the 1871 Congress would not have expected state courts to be required to entertain these claims can be mustered from portions of the legislative history of section 198355 and from language in several Supreme Court decisions. 58 
57.
I do not say that this section gives to the Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. I do not suppose that it is so understood. It leaves it, I presume, in the option of the person who imagines himself to be injured to sue in the State court or in the Federal court .... CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., app. 59. State courts routinely adjudicate claims implicating federal rights. The typical criminal case almost always involves the protection of federal rights, and state judges routinely preside over these matters. Moreover, "tilt denigrates the judges who serve on the state courts to suggest that they will only a means to achieve that end, not an end in itself. Ensuring a state court option only strengthens the commitment to protecting federal rights. The federal courts will, of course, continue to entertain section 1983 actions, 0 but state courts will provide an alternative forum for those claimants who believe that state courts will better protect their federal rights. 6 1
Testa imposes a duty on state courts to entertain federal causes of action. 62 Although section 1983 is a remedial provision and creates no new rights, 3 this characterization does not alter the duty of state courts. State courts are obligated under the supremacy clause to protect federal rights; the remedies under section 1983 and section 1988" provide the means of ensuring that deprivations of federal rights do not go unvindicated. Allowing state courts to refuse to entertain section 1983 actions would "ratify adherence to the very evil the civil rights acts were designed to obviate-the refusal of state courts and officers to vindicate civil rights afforded by the Constitution of the United States. 60. There are, however, a number of cases-most notably state tax actions-in which the federal courts will not be available. See supra notes 14-34 and accompanying text.
61. It would not be proper for a state court to refuse to entertain a § 1983 action because the state court believed it would not protect the claimant's federal rights as well as a federal court. Rather, the claimant is the party most suited to choose the forum that will best protect his rights. The United States Supreme Court is of course available to monitor the holdings of state courts to ensure that these courts are properly protecting claimants' federal rights. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982 
See Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Re-
vised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 187, 207 (requiring state courts to entertain federal causes of action places burden on these courts, and as such, "[i]n the absence of a declaration by Congress that state courts must enforce rights that Congress has created, there appears to be no substantial reason why the Supreme Court should impose such an obligation"). Contra Redish & Muench, supra note 44, at 346-47; Note, supra note 51, at 771-72. Although Dean Sandalow does not examine § 1983 specifically, the cause of action provided by that section is paradigmatic of the congressionally-created rights of action he does examine.
68. 223 U.S. at 58. The Mondou Court made no reference to the source of jurisdiction; it referred only to its existence. Indeed, the Federal Employers Liability Act, the federal statute at issue in Mondou, did not originally mention whether state courts would have jurisdiction over matters arising under the Act. A subsequent amendment noted the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts, but the Supreme Court held that this amendment "instead of granting jurisdiction to the state courts, presupposes that they already possessed it [under the general federal question statute]." Id. at 56.
69. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 70. If state courts were allowed to refuse to entertain a federal cause of action unless Congress specifically enlisted them for the enforcement of the action, those courts would be free to discriminate against federal causes of action by capriciously accepting or rejecting jurisdiction over them. Although such discrimination is proscribed by McKnett, 292 U.S. at 234, congressional silence would be tantamount to a state court license to discriminate. Because Congress intends for the laws that it enacts to be enforced consistently, state courts should be given discretion to decide whether to entertain a federal cause of action only if Congress specifically provides for such discretion. then that court could not refuse to entertain the claimant's section 1982 action. 7 ' The Court so decided notwithstanding that section 1343 does not even mention state courts, much less specifically enlist their help.
396 U.S. 229 (1969

C. The Need for Access to State Courts Even When Federal Courts Are Available
Although access to state courts is of particular importance to taxpayers asserting section 1983 actions because they are foreclosed from proceeding in federal courts, 7 5 the availability of state courts is also important for other section 1983 claimants. Often, due to geographic," time, or financial constraints, 77 a state court is the only practical forum available to a claimant asserting a section 1983 action. Moreover, because in some instances a state court will be the only forum having jurisdiction over the entire controversy and all parties involved, 8 (Mar. 4, 1985) . Moreover, the expense of litigating a matter is usually higher in federal than state court. Id.
78.
A federal court hearing a federal claim or a diversity claim does not have ancillary jurisdiction over a non-diverse party against whom a non-federal claim is being asserted, even if the claim arises out of the same nucleus of operative facts that generated the claim over which the court does have proper jurisdiction. See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). Thus, if a claimant has a § 1983 action against one party and a state-provided cause of action against another non-diverse party, and both claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts, the federal court will not be able to entertain the second cause of action. ' Although the Fondren court correctly determined that a federal court could not have considered the state tax section 1983 claim, the court mistakenly conflated the unavailability of a federal forum into a broader unavailability of section 1983 as a remedy for unconstitutional taxation."' The general policy of federal court noninterference with state taxation forecloses taxpayers from asserting section 1983 actions in federal court; it does not prevent them from pursuing these same remedies in state court. Neither the Eleventh Amendment, the Tax Injunction Act, nor the principle of comity affect th6 actionability of a state tax section 1983 claim in state court, nor do they imply any state immunity from federal interference with state taxation.
The Eleventh Amendment, by its plain language, only addresses the amenability of states to suits in federal court; it does not affect the amenability of states to actions-such as those brought under section 1983-that are asserted in state court. 8 5 Likewise, the Tax Injunction Act does not bar taxpayers from pursuing federal remedies in state courts. 8 6 By its terms, the Act affects only the jurisdiction of the federal district courts. 8 7 The Tax Injunction Act was passed to limit federal court interference 83 . Id. at 723.
84. In ruling that a state court need not entertain a state tax § 1983 claim, the Fondren court relied heavily on the Tax Injunction Act. For analytical purposes, however, this Note will evaluate a broader rationale implicit in Fondren: because state tax § 1983 claims are not actionable in federal court, they may not be asserted in state court either. 
See
87.
The Tax Injunction Act was always referred to as a bill "to amend. . . the Judicial Code • . .with respect to the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States over suits relating to the collection of State taxes." 81 CONG. REc. 1271 (1937) . The text of the Act, which refers only to the federal district courts, makes clear that it is merely a jurisdiction-shifting provision. See supra note 15. The legislative history and narrow focus of the Tax Injunction Act also make dear that the Act was not a congressional preemption of the remedies provided by § 1983 in the area of state taxation. Cf.
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (comprehensive congressional remedial provision in particular field supplants § 1983 in that area).
with state taxation" 8 and merely transfers a class of claims, including federally-provided causes of action, from federal to state court.
9
A persuasive argument can be made that the Tax Injunction Act was enacted, at least in part, to protect state tax revenues by ensuring that individuals pay their taxes before litigating their controversy.
9 0 Allowing state tax section 1983 claims, and indeed, requiring state courts to entertain them, arguably could undermine this goal. The argument is that because a section 1983 claimant is not generally required to exhaust his administrative remedies, 9 1 that claimant can proceed directly to state court, and because the section 1983 action is a federal action, state requirements-such as the requirement that a claimant pay the tax prior to litigating his claim-would not control. A state tax section 1983 cause of action will not, however, jeopardize the integrity of states' tax systems. In the first place, only a taxpayer deprived of a federal constitutional right 92 will be able to assert a successful section 1983 action; most tax challenges lack this crucial element. 9 3 Second, because the state tax section 1983 action lies in state court, rather than in federal court where no exhaustion is required, state courts may be able to require a taxpayer to exhaust state administrative remedies before 88. Congress enacted the Tax Injunction Act for three reasons. First, Congress wanted to curtail the federal district court's burgeoning practice of enjoining state tax collection. As a result of these injunctions, large corporations had often been able to withhold state taxes "in such vast amounts and for such long periods as to disrupt State and county finances, and thus make it possible for such corporations to determine for themselves the amount of taxes they [would] pay." 81 CONG. REc. 1416 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone).
Second, Congress wanted to eliminate discrimination against residents of the state imposing the tax. As a result of federal diversity jurisdiction, non-resident citizens and corporations had a choice between state and federal court, but residents of the forum state were usually compelled to litigate their controversy in state court. Id. at 1416-17.
Third, Congress sought to return control over state tax matters to state courts. Id. There is, however, no evidence that Congress was attempting to free the states from the requirements of the Constitution and the laws enacted by Congress to protect constitutional rights.
89. "The Tax Injunction Act embodied Congress' decision to transfer jurisdiction over a class of substantive federal claims from the federal district courts to the state courts . . . ." Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 515 n.19 (1981); see also California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 411 ("Congress' intent in enacting the Tax Injunction Act was to preventfederal-court interference with the assessment and collection of state taxes") (emphasis added A state cannot, however, establish an administrative exhaustion requirement so onerous that a taxpayer would prefer to forgo his § 1983 claim rather than incur the expense and trouble of meeting the state's "procedural" requirement. It is settled that a state may not, under the guise of state procedure, place obstacles in the path of a federal claimant that defeat his federal rights. See Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24-25 (1923) . Moreover, an exhaustion requirement for § 1983 actions would have to apply equally to any state-provided taxpayer remedies. See McKnett, 292 U.S. at 234 (prohibiting discrimination against federal causes of action). If the state's exhaustion requirement were sufficiently onerous to dissuade a taxpayer from seeking the remedies under § 1983, it would similarly discourage the taxpayer from seeking state-provided remedies. Given these circumstances, the taxpayer's state court remedies-those provided by the state and those under § 1983-would be illusory and therefore would not comply with the requirements of the Tax Injunction Act, see supra note 15 (remedy must be "plain, speedy and efficient"), or the principle of comity as articulated by the Court in McNary, 454 U.S. at 116 (remedy must be "plain, adequate, and complete"). Under the Tax Injunction Act and McNary, therefore, a taxpayer facing such an exhaustion requirement would be granted access to a federal forum in which he could assert a § 1983 action. This solution suffers in that taxpayers are forced to assess whether a federal court will find the state court remedy inadequate, but it does ensure that a state will not ultimately be able to circumvent § 1983 with "procedural" requirements. Moreover, it is possible that an extensive and vexing exhaustion requirement would not comport with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17 (1920) (taxpayer must have opportunity to challenge unconstitutional state taxation).
Although a state may be allowed to require exhaustion of state administrative remedies, the need to ensure the protection of federal rights and the desire to promote judicial economy militate against allowing a state to require § 1983 claimants to exhaust state judicial remedies before proceeding with their § 1983 claims. See Note, Limiting FederalJurisdiction, supra, at 307 & n.125; cf McNary, 454 U.S. at 134 n.22 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that state tax § 1983 claimants should not be able to proceed in federal court until they have exhausted their state administrative remedies, but noting that exhaustion of judicial remedies would not be required).
stantial federal claim, a state tax section 1983 claimant will not be exempted from paying the tax he owes. Section 1983 neither alters the requirements necessary to obtain equitable relief nor prevents a state from enforcing its laws. 9 5 Therefore, a taxpayer cannot, by asserting a section 1983 cause of action, prevent a state from taking its usual steps to collect the taxes which it has levied. Finally, the decision in McNary, which relied on comity to close the federal courts to certain state tax section 1983 claims, is not indicative of any belief that state tax section 1983 actions are themselves improper; the decision merely reflected the belief that these actions are more appropriately handled by state courts. In fact, the McNary Court stated that section 1983 does provide a remedy for taxpayers who are able to prove that their constitutional or federal rights have been denied by a state." 6 The Court, through Justice Rehnquist, indicated that the taxpayers in McNary were free to pursue their federal rights and remedies, including their section 1983 claim, in state court.
97
B. The Proper Defendant in a State Tax Section 1983 Suit
A taxpayer may bring a state tax section 1983 claim against a state official in her individual capacity, against a state official in her official capacity, or against a state. A suit against an official, such as a tax assessor, in her individual capacity is appropriate when the taxpayer is alleging that the official's discretionary acts-such as overassessing the property of nonresidents-led to the deprivation of the taxpayer's constitutional rights. 98 In an individual-capacity suit, the official is personally 95. The fact that a § 1983 claim is being litigated does not in any way prevent the state from taxing the claimant and using the normal methods of ensuring that the tax is paid. Only if the taxpayer is granted an injunction or a declaratory judgment would a state officer face sanctions for enforcing a tax law. The availability of a § 1983 cause of action will not, however, aid taxpayers in restraining tax enforcement because § 1983 does not alter the normal considerations that a court of equity faces. See, e.g., Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814 (1974) (plaintiff required to prove same elements to obtain injunctive relief irrespective of whether such relief is sought under § 1983); see also To prevent taxpayers from obtaining redress under § 1983 in a suit against an official in her official capacity, a state might attempt to grant its officials immunity from suit in state court. If states are not directly subject to suits under § 1983, see supra note 100, such a grant of immunity to an official would effectively foreclose a taxpayer from pursuing the remedies provided by § 1983. Cf supra note 33 (discussing whether state remedies are "adequate" if they do not include opportunity to recover remedies provided by § § 1983 and 1988). In an official-capacity suit, however, the taxpayer is essentially challenging a wrong committed not by an official but by the state itself. The broad purpose underlying § 1983 counsels against allowing a state to foreclose a taxpayer from asserting an otherwise valid cause of action created by Congress to remedy the state's wrong. Cf. 
CONCLUSION
Given that state courts are the only fora in which a taxpayer may seek federal remedies, including attorney's fees, and that these remedies are needed to protect citizens from unconstitutional taxation, it follows that state courts should not be free to close their doors to taxpayers with section 1983 claims. 2 To allow state courts discretion to decide whether to entertain state tax section 1983 claims, is to make the vindication of federal rights dependent on the state in which a taxpayer resides. 1 Short of opening the doors of the federal courts to state tax section 1983 claims-something that the Supreme Court has refused to allow-the only means available of ensuring consistent protection of federal rights for all taxpayers is to require state courts to entertain these claims. 
